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PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE AND EMPIRICAL REASON: 
DISCUSSSION 
BILL BREWER 
 
 
I greatly appreciate the penetrating critical engagement of all my commentators. 
Here I reproduce their comments followed by my individual replies in 
alphabetical order. Some of the most important points that I make, which involve 
a significant revision to the views presented in my paper, are relevant to a 
number of comments. I make these points at the earliest opportunity and refer 
back in subsequent discussions. This explains the disproportionate length of my 
earlier replies. 
 
David de Bruijn 
 
For Brewer, perceptual reasons can be “objectual” in being the objectual truth-
makers for perceptual judgments they support:  
 
Given what ‘F’ means, o itself makes application of F correct: o is 
what makes ‘o is F’ true and in this sense constitutes a reason to 
apply the concept [to o in judgment] (p. 5). 
 
Perceptual knowledge must be a special case of knowledge in this regard: a case 
in which the knowledgeable character of judgment is grounded in the way the 
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very truth-makers for the relevant judgment become subjectively available as 
reasons. 
 
My question concerns the role of conceptual capacities in Brewer’s account. 
Specifically, Brewer holds that an objectual reason for judging “o is F” is 
recognized through the conceptual registration of o’s “visually relevant 
similarities (VR-similarities) with paradigm exemplars of F.”  
 
in registering [o’s] visually relevant similarities with the paradigm 
exemplars that enter into her own understanding of [F], [the 
subject] recognizes the status of the object […] as a reason to judge 
that o is F. (p. 8) 
 
I worry whether Brewer’s conception of the role of conceptual capacities in 
terms of registering VR-similarities can characterize perceptual knowledge as 
“special” in the above sense. 
 
Consider that objectual reasons are, if you will, “quasi-factive”: as truth-makers 
for the fact “o is F”, objectual reasons guarantee the truth of “o is F.” In this sense, 
to recognize o as an objectual reason for F is to recognize what makes it true that 
o is F. 
 
But conceptually registering VR-similarities is not quasi-factive: registering VR-
similarities can make it “evidently correct” or “clearly rational” to judge “o is F”, 
but does not guarantee that “o is F” is true. In this sense, registering VR-
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similarities is not to recognize what makes it true that o is F, because VR-
similarities do not make it true that o is F.  
 
Now, clearly o can both be a reason for judging “o is F” (an objectual reason) and 
some rationalizing factor for judging “o is F” (by making it “evidently correct” to 
judge “o is F” on the basis of o’s VR-similarities). But these are two different 
types of rational status that seeing o could be thought to confer on the perceiving 
subject. If they are not identical, it seems to me not clear that Brewer has 
described perception as the “special case” of knowing I outlined above: a case in 
which the knowledgeable character of judging “o is F” is grounded in recognition 
of reasons that are the very truth-makers for “o is F.” 
 
Reply 
 
David is absolutely right that my account is supposed to be one on which seeing 
that p is a way of knowing that p on which, as he puts it, “the knowledgeable 
character of judgment is grounded in the way the very truth-makers for the 
relevant judgment become subjectively available as reasons” (p. 000). He rightly 
contrasts this with any account on which the status of seeing that p as a case of 
knowing that p is instead to be explained by the subjective availability of factors 
that, although they may make it reasonable to judge that p in some sense, do not 
yet suffice for the truth of p. Implicit in this contrast is a criticism that I also 
endorse of the latter approach that McDowell puts powerfully as follows: it is 
one on which “knowing that … [p] can be constituted by being in a position in 
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which, for all one knows, … [it may not be the case that p]. And that seems 
straightforwardly incoherent” (1982, p. 457). 
 
David’s objection to my view is that it actually falls on the wrong side of this 
contrast for my purposes. For the VR-similarities with paradigm exemplars of F 
that are subjectively accessible in my acquaintance with an o that is indeed F are 
precisely features of o that are common to other objects that merely look F 
although they are not in fact F. 
 
I agree with this objection and wish to propose a significant revision to my view 
in order to respond to it. This revision also improves the explanation available of 
the way in which perception serves as a source of our understanding of what 
certain basic perceptible properties of mind-independent objects are; but this is 
a topic for another occasion.1 I begin by setting out the revised view and then 
explain its impact on David’s objection. 
 
Where previously I attempted to make do with an account of seeing o simply in 
terms of conscious visual acquaintance with o, I now expand the basic 
metaphysics of visual perception to include also acquaintance with certain of the 
basic perceptible features of o, such as its shape and its colour. Thus: 
 
(O1) S sees o iff S is v-acquainted with o from a given point of view and in 
certain circumstances, together designated ‘P’. 
                                                        
1 See Campbell and Cassam (2014) and my (forthcoming) for more on this topic. 
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(O2) o thinly looks F iff S is acquainted with o’s Fness or o merely has VRSs 
with paradigm exemplars of F from P. 
(O3) o thickly looks F iff o thinly looks F and S registers o’s Fness 
(conceptually, as F) or merely registers o’s VRSs with paradigm Fs. 
 
The previous account of illusion and hallucination remain intact. The key 
development here is a disjunctive account of thin looks, as acquaintance with 
Fness in the ‘good’ case, or the mere de facto existence of VRSs with paradigm Fs 
in the ‘bad’, illusory case. 
 
I then propose the following five necessary conditions on seeing that o is F. 
 
(F1) o is F: a reason to apply F. 
(F2) S is acquainted with o from some P 
(F3) S is acquainted with o’s Fness from P. 
(F4) S registers o’s Fness. 
(F5) S judges that o is F. 
 
(F1)-(F4) guarantee that the knowledgeable character of the judgment made at 
(F5) is grounded in the way the very truth-maker for that judgment becomes 
subjectively available as a reason. That truth-maker, o, is an objectual reason 
(F1), made subjectively accessible in (F1) and (F2), as the reason that it is given 
(F4). Hence the account now falls on the right side of David’s helpful contrast. 
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Although this revision implies modifications to my discussion of both error and 
the nature of perceptual reasons in general that I cannot set out explicitly here,2 I 
hope that at least the shape of these is discernible. The overall position remains 
one that endorses Objectual Reasons Priority whilst rejecting Factual Reasons 
Priority. 
 
Chris Hill 
 
Bill Brewer holds that we are aware of objective physical properties of objects at 
the level of experience. It's not clear what the range of these properties is 
supposed to be, but they clearly include properties like objective sizes, objective 
shapes, and objective distances. According to Brewer, and also John McDowell, 
conscious experience puts us directly in touch with such properties.  
 
This view is called into question by two considerations. First, it is challenged by 
the fact that the phenomenology of experience is in constant flux. As an SUV 
drives away from me, its apparent size diminishes; and as a coin spins on its axis, 
its apparent shape changes. The objective properties of objects are 
comparatively stable. Second, Brewer’s view is challenged by experimental 
evidence indicating that phenomenology leads us to misjudge a number of 
objective magnitudes. To Illustrate, work by Frank Durgin indicates that the 
slants of hills appear larger than they actually are, and work by Jack Loomis 
shows that exocentric lengths that are objectively the same size appear to 
decrease with distance.  
                                                        
2 See my reply to Wayne Wu below for a brief indication on the latter. 
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In view of these facts, we cannot explain how things appear to us by supposing 
that experience provides direct access to objective properties. Rather, 
experiential awareness must be concerned with relational, viewpoint-dependent 
properties of some kind. Unlike objective properties, but like appearances, 
viewpoint-dependent properties depend on such factors as distance, lighting, 
and angle of view.  
 
This is not to deny that we are perceptually aware of objective properties. 
Rather, the point is that such awareness is non-phenomenological, post-
experiential, and inferential. Moreover, it requires a long process of learning.  
Consider, for example, the phenomenological cues concerning distance that 
experience makes available. These cues include aerial perspective, height within 
the visual field, and texture gradients. Reflection shows that these are all cues 
that have to be interpreted. The fact that something looks bluish, or has a certain 
height in the visual field, has no intrinsic relation to distance. Because of this, we 
can only become aware of the significance of the cues by learning – specifically, 
learning to make inferences from experiences to higher level states that are 
downstream from experience.  
 
If all of this is right, we should have reservations about Brewer’s contention that 
experience justifies perceptual judgments because it puts us directly in touch 
with the objective properties with which the judgments are concerned. There is 
reason to prefer the view that the relationship between experience and 
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awareness of objective properties is inferential, and that epistemic justification 
derives from the reliability of the relevant inferences.   
 
Reply 
 
Chris rightly characterizes my view as one on which we are acquainted with 
mind-independent physical objects and certain of their properties, such as their 
shapes and colours. He is also of course right that our experience of the very 
same such objects and properties may change over time when the objects 
themselves do not – as when a coin spins on its axis or a shadow moves over a 
uniformly coloured surface – and that our experience may similarly 
systematically mislead about the objective properties of things – as when 
experience of the Müller-Lyer figure misleads us about the relative lengths of its 
two main lines. He draws the conclusion that experience must therefore be of 
something other than the actual shapes and colours of things, from which we 
derive those objective features by some kind of inference. 
 
I deny that any such move is necessary or desirable. Indeed, the account of looks 
presented above is designed precisely to avoid it. For we may be acquainted with 
certain objective properties – the circularity of a coin, say, from (changing) 
points of view from which the coin in question has visually relevant similarities 
with paradigm exemplars of incompatible shape properties. At an angle of 45° to 
straight ahead, for example, it has VRSs with an eccentric ellipse. In misleading 
cases, such VRSs may be made especially salient by cues or context. In this way, 
the actual shape of the coin, say, looks other than it is. But none of this is in any 
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tension with, and indeed depends upon, the fact that the perceiver is acquainted 
with the coin and its circular shape; and indeed it also looks circular even when 
viewed at 45° to straight ahead. This captures the sense in which it looks 
constant in shape even as it spins. Thin looks as elucidated in (O2) above are 
very thick on the ground. 
 
Chris is absolutely right again that what I call above the ‘registration’ of o’s 
Fness, as such, is a conceptual skill that may in certain contexts require practice 
over time. This point motivates a circularity objection that I consider at length in 
the paper. For it highlights a respect in which perceptual knowledge that o is F 
may depend upon prior knowledge that a, b, and c, say, are F. I reply (a) that 
what I propose is an explanatory rather than an anti-sceptically suasive account 
of seeing that o is F; (b) that such prior knowledge need not concern o itself; and 
(c) that in the most basic cases involved in concept acquisition it will be 
testimonial rather than perceptual knowledge of other Fs. 
 
There are inferential/theoretical cases with the structure that Chris proposes. 
Suppose, for example, that I am watching a collection of toy cars racing round a 
track, and that each car has a dial on its roof pointing at a number. I may on this 
basis correctly infer their various speeds. If the dials are accurate, or, even 
better, if I know that they are, then I may arrive at knowledge of their speeds on 
this basis. But perceptual knowledge of the shapes and colours of the things that 
we see around us is absolutely not like this; and it is a virtue rather than a vice of 
my account that it respects this significant contrast. 
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Adam Pautz 
 
I think that perceptual reasons come in degrees. For instance, if you take part in 
a discrimination task, you have more reason to believe that certain shades are 
distinct (shades that clearly look distinct) than you have for believing that others 
are distinct (shades that just barely look distinct). Likewise, if you are engaged in 
a loudness-scaling task, you have more reason to believe that one tone is louder 
than another (a simple ordinal judgment) than you have to believe that the one is 
roughly twice louder the other (a more difficult ratio judgment). But it is unclear 
how Brewer’s account of the epistemic role of experience might accommodate 
this point. For it only appeals to non-gradable notions such as S is acquainted 
with o, S sees that p, S resisters that q.  
 
Reply 
 
I agree with Adam that we can make sense in certain cases of the idea of relative 
degrees to which perception may provide us with reasons to make various 
judgements. There is a natural way to accommodate this idea on the view that I 
propose here as follows. 
 
Objectual reasons as I understand them are objects and their properties, such as 
their shapes and colours, that are the relata of visual acquaintance. These may be 
better or worse reasons for various judgements about those objects. For 
example, a central instance of redness constitutes a better objectual reason to 
judge that that object is red than does a more peripheral instance. Thus, 
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acquaintance with the colour of the former object provides the subject with a 
better reason to judge that that object is red than does acquaintance with the 
colour of the latter. Similarly in the case that Adam cites of shade discrimination, 
where two objects with quite distinct colours together constitute a better 
objectual reason to judge a difference of shade than do pairs of objects with very 
similar colours. 
 
I suggest that we might also extend Adam’s idea to include relative degrees to 
which subjects fall short of having reasons to make certain judgements about 
what they see. For example, seeing a series of increasingly eccentric plane 
ellipses head on in normal circumstances, a subject falls increasingly short of 
having a reason to judge that the figures are circular. Again, my position 
accommodates this extension straightforwardly. For the shapes of the figures in 
question, which contribute by acquaintance to the objectual reasons provided by 
the subject’s perception of them, are increasingly distant from circular. 
 
This response is based on two closely related assumptions: first, that the notions 
of centrality and peripherality make sense in connection with the properties of 
objects concerned; second, that some metric governs these notions in such a way 
as to substantiate the idea that there are relative degrees to which they 
constitute objectual reasons for certain judgements, and indeed that this metric 
may continue beyond the extension of the predicates in question to measure 
increasing distance from being an instance. 
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I am not committed to these assumptions with respect to all properties of mind-
independent physical objects. But I conjecture that they do apply with respect to 
the most basic perceptible properties of such things, like their shapes and their 
colours; and this is all that is required for my purposes here. 
 
Raja Rosenhagen 
 
Objects look various ways to us, Bill Brewer claims, thinly and thickly. Why, I 
wonder, can’t how things thinly look to one vary with one’s concepts, beliefs, and 
expectations?3 
 
Pit, suppose, has never seen or heard of Fs. As Pit lacks the concept F, to him, o 
cannot look to be F. He cannot register its being, nor see it as, F. Suppose o is F. If 
so, o is visually relevantly similar to paradigm examples of F. And if a thing’s 
being so related entails its thinly looking F to one, o thinly looks F to Pit.4 
 
Yet, one could argue, o can thinly look F only to those who possess F. Indeed, 
such concept possession may allow – or even, in experts, force – o’s visual 
features to cohere, in one’s consciousness, in ways specific to instances of F so 
                                                        
3 In what follows, I mostly just refer to concepts, yet take reference to beliefs and 
expectations as understood. 
4 Brewer seems to accept this, as he accepts that ducks look ducklike even to 
children who lack the concept of a duck (Brewer (2011), p. 121 [Chapter 
5.3]). 
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construed, i.e. ways depending on expectations concerning how Fs react if placed 
in various circumstances, expectations absent in those lacking F.5 
 
Experts or phobics, Brewer might propose, register different thin looks o has 
anyway: Different thin looks are salient to different subjects.6 Experts and 
phobics, he could hold, routinely register, or mask out, certain thin looks that 
laymen and non-phobics may or cannot register, or will not mask out. Yet the 
question is: Why think o thinly looks all conceivably visually relevant ways to 
any subject whatsoever (including, perhaps, ones that may become relevant only 
in the distant future)?  
 
Allowing that how objects thinly look can vary with one’s concepts may help 
accommodate expert vision, racial perceptual bias, wishful or fearful seeing, etc. 
Moreover, the variation of how things look to one is conceivable, its occurrence, 
perhaps, empirically demonstrable.7 Suppose it were demonstrated. Would this 
be the end of Brewer’s view? What reasons, if any, can entitle philosophers to 
rule out such variation as impossible? Perhaps Brewer does not. If so, can he 
accommodate it? 
 
                                                        
5 The idea that features of what one sees may cohere in different ways, 
depending on what concepts and beliefs one has at one’s disposal, goes back 
to the discussion of the so-called theory-ladenness of observation in Hanson 
(1958), who in turn may have taken it from Wittgenstein. 
6 See Brewer’s contribution to this volume, section 1. 
7 Susanna Siegel, in her contribution to this volume, arguably builds her entire 
account based on the idea that such cases are conceivable, an idea shared by 
many contributors to the debate concerning the so-called cognitive 
penetration of perception, even though whether such variation is actual is 
contentious. 
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Reply 
 
Raja is right that o thinly looks F to Pit on my view, provided that his point of 
view and circumstances are appropriate. Thin looks are intended to capture the 
way that normally functioning vision provides the subject with a conscious 
experiential perspective upon what is actually there in the world around her, 
regardless of what she goes on to make of it. They capture the way in which 
those of us with the relevant concepts may characterize the nature of that 
perspective regardless of the perceiver’s own conceptual sophistication. Faced 
with a plane hexagon, for example, we may rightly use that concept to say what 
shape she sees even if she is unable to put it in those terms herself. Indeed, it is 
precisely because this characterization of her perspective is correct that her 
experience may contribute to her subsequent acquisition of the concept of a 
hexagon. The concept is apt to characterize how things (thinly) are for her 
visually even before she has it. Resisting the idea that thin looks have application 
in this way is therefore inconsistent with the empiricist thesis that I endorse that 
perceptual experience plays an ineliminable explanatory role in the acquisition 
of certain basic concepts for mind-independent objects.8 It acquaints us with 
certain shapes and colours themselves, for example, that play a fundamental role 
in our possession of concepts for those shapes and colours. In being so 
acquainted, objects look just those ways independently of any conceptual 
registration of their doing so. The revised account of thin looks offered above is 
intended to capture precisely this phenomenon. 
                                                        
8 See Campbell and Cassam (2014) for important debate about this thesis, and 
my (forthcoming) for more on my own position. 
 15 
 
Raja also outlines very well the need for a further notion of the way things look 
that is highly sensitive to the conceptual capacities of the perceiver, along with 
her cognitive focus, interests, purposes, expertise, bias, wishes, fears, and so on. 
My view is ideally placed to capture all that is required her too, precisely as Raja 
predicts, in terms of thick looks: those amongst the ways things thinly look that 
are registered by the perceiver, given all of these relevant factors. The key point 
to stress here is that thick looks are genuinely phenomenological. They indicate a 
specific cognitive modification of the perceiver’s consciousness, a further feature 
of her experiential perspective upon the world. As such I see no reason why they 
cannot accommodate all the phenomena that Raja mentions and provide all the 
explanation that he rightly requires. 
 
Miloš Vuletić 
 
In cases of perceptual illusion, according to Bill Brewer, a subject is acquainted 
with an object o that is, say, G, but looks F. Brewer claims that the object o is a 
reason to apply the concept G, but the subject is not presented with a reason to 
judge that o is G, since o does not look G.9 The subject is not presented with a 
reason to judge that o is F either, and “o is no reason to apply F at all.” 
 
                                                        
9 The object o is an objectual reason to apply the concept G, according to Brewer; 
this is so because o is a truth-maker for ‘o is G’. The subject will have reason to 
judge that o is G, on Brewer’s account, when the object looks both thinly and 
thickly G to her. Brewer also recognizes the notion of a factual reason. The 
subject of an illusion is not presented with a factual reason to judge that o is F, 
either. 
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Brewer thus claims that it is not rational for the subject of an illusion to judge 
that o is F, even though o looks F. This is problematic. Here is why: if it is not 
rational for the subject to judge that o is F, there is no attitude that it is rational 
for the subject to adopt with respect to this judgment. 
 
It is not rational to disbelieve that o is F: there are no grounds for the subject to 
judge that o is anything other than F.10 
 
It is also not rational to withhold judgment that o is F. For the subject to 
withhold, her evidence should be, on balance, neither in favor of judging that o is 
F nor in favor of judging that o is not F (Comesaña, 2013). But this is not the case: 
the subject’s grounds for judging that o is F are on balance stronger—the object 
looks F to her.11 This is why Brewer finds the subject’s error in judging that o is F 
understandable: it is plausible to recognize that the subject’s mistaken judgment 
is somehow grounded in her experience. The subject does not apply the concept 
F by accident—there is an element of the phenomenology that prompts the 
application of F.  
 
Brewer’s position commits him to the claim that the subject of an illusion cannot 
be rational in taking any attitude towards judgment that o is F: she should not 
withhold, assent to, or disbelieve that o is F. This is an undesirable consequence: 
intuitively, many cases of illusion do not involve such peculiar breakdowns of 
                                                        
10 The fact that o is G is not a ground for the subject to judge that o is G (or that o 
is not F) on Brewer’s own view because the object does not look G, hence the 
subject does not recognize o as G (or as non-F). 
11 In fact, o looks F both thinly and thickly in Brewer’s sense. 
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rationality. The observation that the subject has some grounds in o’s looks for 
judging that o is F shows a better way of accounting for illusions: besides 
objectual and factual reasons, we should recognize subjective perceptual reasons 
for judgment, i.e., reasons provided by phenomenology of experiences, both 
veridical and non-veridical.12 
 
Reply 
 
Miloš raises a number of interesting issues about cases in which an object, o, that 
is G and not F nevertheless looks F. On my view this is a matter of o having VRSs 
with paradigm exemplars of F from the point of view and in the circumstances in 
question. Especially given the revisions to my position noted above, the best 
response I can give to his comments is to consider the various possible cases 
falling under this description in turn. An important point to make at the start 
about all such cases, though, is that, although the perceiver is not acquainted 
with an objectual reason to apply F, things are visually for him in certain respects 
just as they would be if he were so acquainted. Although he does not, it is for him 
as if he had reason to apply F. This is part of why any such judgement that he 
does make is understandable, although not rational: it is for him as if it were 
rational. 
 
An o that is G may look F in cases in which the perceiver is actually acquainted 
with o’s Gness. For example, if I see a coin at 45° to straight ahead, although it 
                                                        
12 On the notion of subjective reason similar to what I have in mind here see 
Schroeder (2008). 
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looks elliptical, it may also look round, since I may be acquainted with its actual 
shape.13 Indeed, it may be that very circular shape that looks to me other than it 
is. If I further register its circularity, as I may well do in any normal situation, 
then I may knowledgeably judge it to be circular, whilst also recognizing its 
current elliptical look too. If I do not, then I am still acquainted with an objectual 
reason to apply G, though I fail to register it as such. 
 
In either this case or any in which I am not acquainted with o’s actual Gness, I 
may instead register the VRSs that o has with paradigm Fs. This is, I think, the 
case that Miloš has in mind, in which o thinly and thickly looks F. Here there is a 
factual reason made available by perception that plausibly confers genuine 
rationality on the mistaken application of F, over and above the ‘as if’ rationality 
noted at the start of my reply, namely, that o looks F. This may be known by 
application of the ascent routine sketched in my paper. Then, either because the 
transition from the fact that o looks F to the actual Fness of o is de facto generally 
quite reliable, or because the subject knows/believes that it is, he may be 
rational in deriving that conclusion, that o is F, understandably mistaken as it 
may be. Taken together with the earlier ‘as if’ rationality, I claim that this 
captures what should be said in favour of that mistaken judgement in such cases. 
 
The crucially important point for me, though, is that this is absolutely not the 
structure of the rationality of perceptual knowledge in normal cases, with the 
only difference being that the conclusion reached is true in such knowledgeable 
cases. In seeing that o is F we do not derive a conclusion about the world in this 
                                                        
13 See also my reply to Chris Hill above. 
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way from a premises about the way things look; and it is a fundamental virtue of 
the alternative account that I offer in my may paper to explain how seeing that o 
is F is indeed a way of knowing that o is F that it avoids any such implication.14 
 
Wayne Wu 
 
I wish to supplement Brewer’s rich account of perceptual knowledge by 
highlighting concepts that should figure in further elaboration. The missing 
concepts are critical for understanding agency: attention, learning, skill or 
expertise, and automaticity. All of these can be understood technically, and they 
should have more of a central role in discussions of perceptual knowledge. 
Brewer focuses on seeing an object O and registering that it is an F which 
“involves the active deployment of the concept of an F” (4). He takes 
“registration” as a primitive and it is here that I think more can be said. 
 
There can be clear differences between individuals who grasp a concept F but 
differ in how they apply it in perceptual judgments. A learner might have to 
make a special effort in attending to relevant similarities that individuate F’s. 
Concept application is an intentionally substantial activity. It is not clear to me 
what sort of attention Brewer has in mind when he invokes it, and the absence of 
emphasis on properties is striking, especially given how much feature attention 
informs our actions. Consider in contrast an expert who, given the task, has their 
attention automatically captured by individuating features so that the concept is 
automatically applied. There is nothing else for the expert to do than simply 
                                                        
14 See my reply to Wayne Wu below for a little more on this important point. 
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come to recognize the O as an F in this way. In both cases, the resulting 
judgments can count as knowledge. 
 
Once we draw on these additional concepts, the expert knower seems to me to 
be different than the cases Brewer describes. I don’t think he would disagree, but 
then, registration is not conceptually primitive. There is more to say. We might 
put the knower’s position this way: she simply sees that O is F. There is no 
inference, no effortful attention, no casting about for more evidence. O’s Fness is 
patently clear. That is the psychological reality of actual knowers, and we are all 
perceptual experts for a wide swathe of Fs. In attending to O and relevant 
features (and thereby being acquainted with them), one automatically applies 
the concept. 
 
Brewer’s description seems to divide perception and cognition too starkly: 
perception is imbued with cognition in the expert knower. His description of the 
transition from perception to knowledge seems more to incline towards the 
perspective of the learner and not that of the expert where the transitions 
between perception and cognition are clearer. For the expert, inference as an 
active process, conscious or not, drops out. The normal case, then, is knowing by 
perceiving attentively in this way. 
 
Reply 
 
As he predicts, there is little in Wayne’s comments that I really disagree with. His 
main focus is on the nature of our conceptual registration of the basic properties 
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that we are acquainted with in perception, such as the shapes and colours of the 
various objects around us that we see. In particular, he wishes to highlight the 
role in such registration of attention, learning, skill, and automaticity. I 
absolutely agree that these are important components of registration. 
Registration involves attention, which may range from the effortful and time-
consuming in learners to the relatively automatic and immediate in experts; and 
it constitutes the exercise of a conceptual skill, which may in this way be 
possessed to a greater or lesser degree of excellence. 
 
This is perfectly consistent with the respect in which I regard registration as a 
theoretical primitive. For this consists simply in the denial that any theoretical 
reduction may be given of conceptual registration in these or any other terms. 
Nevertheless, Wayne is quite right to insist that that empirical and theoretical 
work in these areas will help to elaborate further what is involved in registration 
and how we acquire and accomplish this skilled conceptual activity. 
 
Wayne is also right to point out that my lack of consideration of acquaintance 
with, and registration of, perceptible properties is a deficiency in the view set out 
in my paper. I seek to address this, albeit sketchily, in my reply to David above. 
 
Finally, Wayne is again right to stress that there is no inference involved in 
normal cases of seeing that o is F. But it would be wrong to interpret my position 
along any such inferentialist lines. Indeed, this is precisely the point of my denial 
of Factual Reasons Priority. Still, I claim to have given a substantive explanatory 
justification of the status of seeing that o is F as a way of knowing that o is F by 
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appeal to Objectual Reasons Priority and my associated adoption of the structure 
of Van Cleve’s (1979) response to the Cartesian Circle objection. 
 
Correcting for the inclusion of acquaintance with basic perceptible properties, I 
claim that 
 
(B1) For all o and all F, seeing that o is F  knowing that o is F 
 
does not depend for its truth upon 
 
(B2) The perceiver knows that (for all o and all F, seeing that o is F  being 
acquainted with o’s Fness and registering this as F) 
 
but only upon the de facto truth of what is known in (B2), namely 
 
(B3) For all o and all F, seeing that o is F  being acquainted with o’s Fness 
and registering this as F 
 
Thus, we do not infer o’s Fness from facts about our acquaintance and 
registration that are supposed to be given in perception and known in advance of 
o’s Fness itself. Nevertheless, in being acquainted with o’s Fness and registering 
it as such, perception provides us with objectual reasons, recognized as such, for 
our basic knowledgeable empirical judgements. 
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